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 Although abortion is legal, seven states currently criminalize self-induced abortion,1
and many other states criminalize activities associated with it.2 Self-induced abortion is 
-administering pharmaceutical pills, traditional herbs, or other 
3 However, the term self-induced 
abortion is somewhat of a misnomer because an individual who self-induces may receive 
assistance from a caregiver such as a friend or family member. While courts recognize the 
egal history has relegated 
the lawful practice of abortion solely to the medical industry.4 As a result, those who assist 
with self-induced abortion as caregivers have limited legal recourse when they are 
confronted with criminal charges. But what is the o
motivates caregiving for self-induced abortion? This law review comment examines 
religious exercise in the context of self-induced abortion, ultimately demonstrating that 
caregivers who act from a religious or spiritual perspective can likely assert state Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) as a defense if they are charged with a crime such as 
the unauthorized practice of medicine. 
Religious freedom laws are often associated with socially conservative political 
agendas.5 Yet, they also expand religious exercise protections for those whose beliefs are 
6 Indeed, 
asserting that religious or spiritual beliefs can motivate caregiving in the case of self-
                                                          
 1. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3604; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 652; IDAHO CODE § 18-606(2); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.220; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.; OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-733; OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21 § 862; S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-80(b); see also Letter from Farah Diaz-Tello, Senior Counsel, Self-
Induced Abortion Legal Team, & Cynthia Soohoo, Director, Human Rights and Gender Justice Clinic, City 
University of New York School of Law to U.N. Working Group on Discrimination Against Women in Law and 
Practice uthor).   
2. See infra Part IV.A.2; see also Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 8.  
 3. Jill E. Adams & Melissa Mikesell, Primer on Self-Induced Abortion, THE SIA LEGAL TEAM,
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/aa251a_8ff3236264b54fed955aa99c0ea7ca59.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2017). 
 4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165
physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to points where important 
id. at 113, 116 17, 120 21, 162, 163; see also 
discussion infra Part IV.A and notes 165 70. 
 5. S. POVERTY L. CTR., ELIGIOUS LIBERTY  AND THE ANTI-LGBT RIGHT 3 4 (2016); see Tom Gjelten, 
Conservatives Call for ‘Religious Freedom,’ But for Whom?, NPR: RELIGION (Dec. 11, 2015) (stating that 
several of the 2015 conservative political candidates used religious freedom as a platform), 
https://www.npr.org/2015/12/11/458969192/conservatives-call-for-religious-freedom-but-for-whom. 
 6. Cf. , 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (directly referencing the 
Thomas decision in its most recent federal RFRA analysis, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 
724 (2014), the Supreme Court affirmed that under RFRA courts cannot determine the reasonableness of an 
). 
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induced abortion may seem incomprehensible. Nevertheless, the issue is worth exploring 
because caregiving is a centuries-old practice that still occurs today.7 In addition, evidence 
that religion and abortion are not inherently at odds is widely available. Some 
congregational and spiritual leaders are trained in pastoral care for abortion and offer 
support to laypeople who are seeking abortion.8 In addition, a majority of in-clinic abortion 
patients identify with a religious practice.9 Further, some doctors have stated that they will 
perform abortions because of their religion.10 Thus, the assertion that self-induced abortion 
may occur within a religious or spiritual context has substantial support: research indicates 
that individuals still choose to self-induce and that religious individuals and spiritual 
leaders take part in abortion practices.11
While there are ews on 
abortion, there is little research regarding the intersection of religious practice and abortion 
outside of clinical settings.12 Moreover, there is no legal scholarship identifying how self-
induced abortion may relate to religious practice and how it may be protected by state 
RFRAs. This comment examines how religion may motivate caregiving for self-induced 
abortion and considers whether a state RFRA can provide an adequate defense for a 
caregiver facing criminal charges. 
State RFRAs provide a potential defense for caregivers because they typically offer 
greater protections for religious exercise than the First Amendment.13 Many RFRAs 
require courts to apply strict scrutiny if a state substantially burdens religiously-
motivated criminal activity, a state must prove that it has a compelling interest in doing 
applicable to everyone.14 Further, a state must demonstrate that imposing the substantial 
burden is the least restrictive means of advancing its compelling interest. 
To explain the differences between religious exercise protections under the Free 
                                                          
7. See KATI SCHINDLER ET AL., NATIVE AM. WOMEN S HEALTH EDUC. RES. CTR., INDIGENOUS WOMEN S
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 2 (2002); Molly Dutton-Kenny, Part II: The Historical Legacy of Midwives as Abortion 
Providers in the United States, SQUAT BIRTH J. 21 (Winter 2013-2014); LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION 
WAS A CRIME 6, 9 10 (1997). 
8. Pastoral Care Training, RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR REPROD. CHOICE, http://rcrc.org/pastoral-care/ (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2017). 
 9. Jenna Jerman & Rachel K. Jones et al., GUTTMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION 
PATIENTS IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008 1, 7 (May 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/report/characteristic 
s-us-abortion-patients-2014. 
 10. DR. WILLIE PARKER, LIFE S WORK: A MORAL ARGUMENT FOR CHOICE 2 (2017). See Rebecca Luckett, 
I’m a Catholic obstetrician who had an abortion. This is not politics or religion. It’s life., USA TODAY (Mar. 19, 
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/03/19/catholic-obstetrician-who-had-abortion-not-politic 
s-religion-its-life-rebecca-luckett-column/416614002/ (stating that because her Catholic education centered 
 11. D. GROSSMAN & K. WHITE ET AL., TEX. POL Y EVALUATION PROJECT, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION, AND 
EXPERIENCE RELATED TO ABORTION SELF-INDUCTION IN TEXAS 1, 2 (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/txpep/_files/pdf/TxPEP-Research-Brief-KnowledgeOpinionExperience.pdf. 
12. Very Few Americans See Contraception as Morally Wrong, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2016), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2016/09/28/4-very-few-americans-see-contraception-as-morally-wrong. 
13. Compare 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 447 (2018), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, IND. CODE § 
34-13-9-9, and Tyms-Bey v. State, 69 N.E.3d 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 
 14. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15; IDAHO 
CODE § 73-402; IND. CODE § 34-13-9-8.  
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Exercise Clause and state RFRAs, Part II of this comment briefly examines twentieth-
century applications of free exercise jurisprudence and describes the environment in which 
state RFRAs emerged. When Congress enacted the federal RFRA, it intended to codify 
the application of strict scrutiny to laws of general applicability if those laws imposed 
substantial burdens on religious exercise. Although the federal RFRA was invalidated as 
Thus, Part II introduces why state RFRAs might provide better protections for caregivers 
as opposed to a traditional First Amendment claim. 
religious 
exercise. Specifically, Part III acknowledges the complicated nature of applying state 
RFRAs, particularly in the context of criminal justice. Generally, state RFRA claims are 
infrequent and, in most states, local RFRA case law related to criminal charges is lacking. 
ce 
for interpreting and applying RFRA statutes and often look for guidance from federal 
sources of authority.15 Acknowledging these difficulties, Part III posits that when a 
caregiver is charged with a crime because she assists others with self-induced abortion, 
state courts could likely adopt the federal RFRA application outlined in the Supreme 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. decision. Part III also describes why the 
federal RFRA analysis in Hobby Lobby is likely the most advantageous interpretation for 
caregivers asserting a RFRA defense. 
Part IV addresses whether a state RFRA is ultimately a viable defense for a 
caregiver. Although most states do not explicitly criminalize self-induced abortion, law 
enforcement and prosecutors sometimes charge caregivers with criminal statutes 
associated with protecting public health and safety, such as the unauthorized practice of 
medicine.16 In the wake of criminal prosecutions for self-induced abortion and caregiving, 
Part IV applies the RFRA analysis of Hobby Lobby to instances when a caregiver assists 
with self-induced abortion in her capacity as a religious or spiritual leader. By applying 
the Hobby Lobby analysis, a caregiver is able to successfully assert a state RFRA as a 
defense to criminal charges becau religious exercise and 
substantial burden in Hobby Lobby are quite broad. Moreover, the Hobby Lobby ruling 
requires states to provide conclusive evidence that the substantial burdens they impose on 
religious exercise are the least restrictive means of doing so. Accordingly, Part IV 
concludes that the prosecution of caregivers is not narrowly tailored enough to pass strict 
scrutiny.17
                                                          
15. See Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d at 490; State v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 733 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013). 
16. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 17. Brian L. Porto, Background, Summary, and Comment, Validity, Construction, and Operation of State 
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 116 A.L.R. 5th 233 § 2 (2004). 
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II. STATE RFRAS EMERGE FROM TRADITIONAL FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Twentieth-Century Applications of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause 
1. The Supreme Court Adopts Strict Scrutiny 
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court provided that the Free Exercise 
Clause only protected religious belief and not religiously-motivated actions.18 For 
polygamy and held that some religious actions were not protected under the Free Exercise 
Clause.19 se began to shift near the mid-
twentieth century. In 1940, the Court decided Cantwell v. Connecticut, where it clarified 
its stance on religious exercise by incorporating the Free Exercise Clause into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 As a result, religious exercise was 
officially recognized as a fundamental right and its protection was applicable to both the 
states and the federal government.21
Once the Court ruled the Free Exercise Clause applied to the states, protections for 
religiously-motivated behavior began to emerge in a piecemeal fashion. Slowly, the Court 
introduced strict scrutiny and applied it to neutral laws of general applicability in religious 
exercise cases. In 1944, just four years after the Cantwell decision, the Court held that 
that states did not have the power to scrutinize the truth or the validity of such beliefs.22
scrutiny to religious exercise violations. Justice Warren held that a state could impose 
did not have another, less restrictive statutory scheme to do so.23
Although the decisions following Cantwell forged a path for subjecting free exercise 
claims to strict scrutiny, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny to neutral laws of general 
applicability until it heard Sherbert v. Verner in 1963.24 In Sherbert, an individual 
challenged a South Carolina law after she was denied unemployment benefits. Under the 
law, the state denied her unemployment benefits because she refused to work on 
Saturday a work requirement that conflicted with her religious beliefs.25 On review, the 
exercise.26
                                                          
 18. PEW RES. CTR., A DELICATE BALANCE: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT 2 3
(Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.pewforum.org/2007/10/24/a-delicate-balance-the-free-exercise-clause-and-the-
supreme-court [hereinafter DELICATE BALANCE]. 
19. Id.
20. See 310 U.S. 296, 302 (1940). 
 21. DELICATE BALANCE, supra note 18, at 4. 
22. Id. at 5 6.
 23. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 07 (1961). 
24. See 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1248 (3d ed. 2006). 
25. 374 U.S. at 401. 
26. Id. at 403 04. 
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applying strict scrutiny to neutral laws of general applicability when a restriction on 
religious exercise was in question.27 Most notably, the majority held that the directness of 
the law was unconstitutional.28 Thus, even laws that only indirectly or incidentally 
burdened free exercise were subject to strict scrutiny.29 The Sherbert ruling was a 
watershed moment in the protection of religious exercise for two reasons. First, prior to 
Sherbert, strict scrutiny had only been fully applied to laws challenged under free speech 
or racial discrimination claims.30 Second, the Sherbert ruling directly informed the intent 
and drafting process of the federal and state RFRAs. 
2. The Supreme Court Rejects Strict Scrutiny 
Despite the initial application of strict scrutiny to religious exercise cases, the Court 
regularly refused to apply it to First Amendment claims, or when the Court did, it only 
infrequently sided with claimants.31 For instance, in Bob Jones University v. United States,
the university challenged an IRS restriction that denied tax-exempt status to educational 
entities with racially discriminatory policies.32
d in Sherbert . . . 33
The Bob Jones University decision echoed previous Court opinions regarding the 
application of strict scrutiny to religious exercise claims. Thus, deference to states 
continued throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, as the Court typically only 
protected religiously-motivated conduct in a limited number of circumstances.34
Sherbert ruling comes as no 
ehension to apply 
strict scrutiny to laws challenged under the Free Exercise Clause. The 1990 decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith marked the official declaration of Sherbert’s end as applied 
to First Amendment claims. In Smith, claimants were terminated from employment for 
their ceremonial use of peyote in a Native American Church ceremony.35 When the 
claimants filed for unemployment benefits they were denied because the sacramental use 
of peyote constituted work misconduct.36 The 
                                                          
27. Id. at 406 07.   
28. Id. at 403 04. 
29. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 516, 607 (1961)). 
 30. DELICATE BALANCE, supra note 18, at 7. 
31. See, e.g.
of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 05 (1985). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 1248. 
 32. See 461 U.S. 574, 574 (1983). 
 33. DELICATE BALANCE, supra note 18, at 9. 
 34. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24,
 Id. First, the Court upheld challenges to statutes requiring school attendance. Id.
Id.
 35. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990). 
36. Id.
6
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laws was unconstitutional. However, the Court held that Sherbert was 
inapplicable.37 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia articulated that neutral laws of 
general applicability could not be subject to strict scrutiny when the prohibition of the 
exercise of religion was only an indirect or incidental result of the laws.38
decision shocked lower courts and legal scholars, and it provoked significant protest from 
religious rights groups and civil liberties organizations.39
B. The Smith and Flores Rulings Catalyzed Congress and State Legislatures to Pass 
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 
Smith, Congress intentionally diverged from 
the Smith decision when it enacted the federal RFRA and codified strict scrutiny for 
religious exercise claims.40 In referencing Smith
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise 
41 In comparison, Congress found that because 
religious  . 
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with [it] 42 Congress also 
43
As a result, the federal RFRA effectively guaranteed the application of strict scrutiny to 
religious exercise claims that challenged laws traditionally considered generally applicable 
and neutral toward religion.44
Despite the enactment of the federal RFRA, its application to local state actions was 
relatively short-lived. In 1997, the Supreme Court heard City of Boerne v. Flores.45 In 
Boerne, an archbishop challenged a zoning ordinance under RFRA after municipal 
authorities denied him a permit to expand a church building.46 On review, the Supreme 
Court ruled the federal RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state laws and local 
governments.47  . . intrusion at every 
48 When it enacted the federal RFRA, Congress exceeded its scope 
49
                                                          
37. Id. at 882 84.   
38. Id. at 872, 878. 
 39. PEW RES. CTR., The Smith Decision (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.pewforum.org/2007/10/24/a-delicate-
balance6. 
 40. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious-
practices.html?mcubz=0&mcubz=0. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4). 
42. Id. at § 2000bb(a)(1) (2). 
43. Id.
 44. Mary L. Topliff, Summary and Comment  Generally, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.), 135 A.L.R. FED. 121 (1996). 
45. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
46. Id. at 507. 
47. Id. at 508, 536.   
48. Id. at 532. 
49. Id. at 508. 
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In contrast, the Court held that Congress may only enforce a pre-existing constitutional 
right as permitted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.50 Thus, although the federal 
RFRA remains applicable to claims and defenses against federal statutes, it is no longer 
applied to religious freedom claims or challenges to state laws. 
Although the Boerne ruling invalidated the federal RFRA, many state legislatures 
and courts have enacted legislation or decided cases in favor of religious exercise.51
Between 1993 and 1997, only two states emulated the federal RFRA: Connecticut and 
Rhode Island.52 But since the Boerne decision, nearly half of the states have enacted 
RFRAs or similar religious freedom laws that expand religious exercise protections.53 Of 
those states, five have statutes or state constitutional amendments that afford incredibly 
re the burden or restriction on religious 
54 Further, some courts in states without RFRAs sometimes 
broadly construe the religious freedom provisions of state constitutions to increase the 
protection of free exercise.55
III. STATE INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF RFRAS
A. Applying State RFRAs in a Criminal Defense Context Presents Complex Issues of 
Statutory Interpretation 
1. Many Factors Problematize Asserting a State RFRA as a Defense to Criminal 
Charges 
Due to the discriminatory nature of recent RFRA claims,56 much of the discussion 
                                                          
50. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508. 
51. See 2016 State Religious Freedom Restoration Act Legislation, NAT L CONF. OF ST. LEGS. (Dec. 31, 
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2016-state-religious-freedom-restoration-act-
legislation.aspx. 
 52. Religious Freedom Restoration Acts Legisbrief, NAT L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, Vol. 23, No. (May 
RFRA Legisbrief
53. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-401; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01; 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5301; Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT L CONF.
OF ST. LEGS. (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/religious-freedom-
restoration-acts-lb.aspx. 
54. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01, § III; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-3, 28-22-5; MO. REV. STAT. § 
1.302(1)(2); RFRA Legisbrief, supra note 52. 
 55. Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 164 
(2016) [hereinafter RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities]; Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After 
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 466 67 (2010) [hereinafter A Look at State RFRAs]. See 
generally Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State Constitutions, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POLIC Y 103, 103, 186 87 (2013) (concluding that some state courts interpret state 
constitutions according to pre-Smith rulings, thereby providing greater protection for free exercise claims than 
current First Amendment federal case law). 
56. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 683 84 (2014) (holding that for-profit 
corporations were included under the definition of person for the purposes of RFRA). Further, although no state 
RFRA claims were involved in Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., a cake shop asserted that the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment after it penalized him for refusing 
to provide services to a same-sex couple that requested a wedding cake. Craig, 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015). 
See also Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2013) (where plaintiff-photographers 
asserted a violation of free exercise after they refused to provide a same-sex couple with wedding photography 
8
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regarding the federal Act and state RFRAs understandably centers on how religious pretext 
is used to harm the LGBTQ community and women.57 Yet, state RFRA jurisprudence is 
relatively scant.58 A more in-depth look at the use of state RFRAs reveals that there is not 
an abundance of state RFRA cases.59 For instance, three states Oklahoma, Idaho, and 
New Mexico enacted state religious freedom laws mirroring the federal RFRA in 2000.60
But in the last seventeen years, Oklahoma courts have adjudicated only three RFRA 
cases.61 Likewise, Idaho and New Mexico courts have each only reviewed five RFRA 
claims.62 Additional research also indicates that states with considerable RFRA case law 
are the exception to the general rule that state RFRAs are not often litigated.63
Of the existing RFRA case law available, there is a particularly limited number of 
decisions in which a defendant asserted a state RFRA as a criminal defense. Of the thirteen 
cases referenced above, only three involved RFRA as a criminal defense.64 Two of the 
three RFRA criminal defense cases were reviewed in Idaho,65 while the other was heard 
in New Mexico.66
an explanation is absent, the Indiana RFRA statute is used frequently as a criminal 
defense.67 Yet, records indicate that the Indiana Court of Appeals has heard only one 
RFRA criminal defense case since the Indiana legislature enacted the law in 2015.68
                                                          
discrimination laws). 
57. See, e.g., Louise Melling, ACLU: Why we can no longer support the federal ‘religious freedom’ law,
WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-should-amend-the-abused-
religious-freedom-restoration-act/2015/06/25/ee6aaa46-19d8-11e5-ab92-
c75ae6ab94b5_story.html?utm_term=.9af163a505e0; Katy Steinmetz, The Debate Over What Indiana’s 
Religious Freedom Act is Really About, TIME (Mar. 30, 2015), http://time.com/3764347/indiana-religious-
freedom-discrimination-act; Emma Green, Gay Rights May Come at the Cost of Religious Freedom, ATLANTIC
(Jul. 27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/legal-rights-lgbt-discrimination-religious-
freedom-claims/399278. 
58. RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, supra note 55, at 164; A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 
RFRAs likely increase favorable settlements for religious claimants). 
59. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 480. 
 60. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 251; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1; IDAHO CODE § 73-402. 
61. See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (E.D. Okla. 2008); Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d 
, 2 (Okla. 2017). 
62. See Olsen v. Idaho St. Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2004); Roles v. Townsend, 64 P.3d 338, 
tate v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 
730, 732 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013); State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1219 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011). See, e.g., Ross v. 
Bd. of Regents of the U. of N.M., 599 F.3d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir. 2010); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 
309 P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2013); St. ex rel. Peterson v. Aramark Corr. Servs., 321 P.3d 128, 131, 137 38 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2014); State v. Bent, 328 P.3d 677, 678 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013). 
63. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 479 80. 
64. See Cordingley, 302 P.3d at 731; White, 271 P.3d at 1219; Bent, 328 P.3d at 678. 
65. See Cordingley, 302 P.3d at 730 31; White, 271 P.3d 1217. 
66. See Bent, 328 P.3d 677. 
 67. Josh Sanburn, How Indiana’s Religious Freedom Law is Being Used to Defend Child Abuse and Other 
Crimes, TIME (Sept. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4481073/indiana-rfra-law-child-abuse. See generally Maya 
Rhodan, Indiana Religious Freedom Law Breeds ‘First Church of Cannabis,’ TIME (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://time.com/3764983/indiana-religious-freedom-law-breeds-first-church-of-cannabis/?iid=sr-link8 
(discussing the creation of the First Church of Cannabis, which uses the illegal substance cannabis as a sacrament, 
 68. Tyms-Bey v. State, 69 N.E.3d 488, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 
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Even among the anomalous states with frequent local RFRA litigation, the number 
of instances where RFRAs are used as a criminal defense is incredibly low. In 1998, 
Illinois enacted its particularly broad RFRA,69 which allows a claimant to challenge any 
state law or regulation and provides that RFRA may be used as a criminal defense.70 Since 
71
Similarly, Texas enacted its RFRA in 1999,72
73 Not surprisingly, there are no available 
opinions discussing whether a state RFRA is a viable defense for a caregiver who assists 
others with self-induced abortion. 
The lack of state RFRA criminal defense cases does not have a simple explanation. 
For instance, on the rare occasions when defendants do assert a RFRA as a defense, the 
plea-bargaining process may influence its use in further prosecution.74 In addition, some 
states limit the use of their RFRAs under certain circumstances.75 Although some states 
76
other states expressly exempt the application of RFRA to certain laws that might otherwise 
be violated due to a bona fide religious practice.77 In Florida, a claimant cannot assert the 
-related charges.78
not available to defendants whose religion may motivate or require them to violate existing 
provisions regarding health, safety, or licenses to practice medicine.79
The lack of uniformity in applying strict scrutiny to RFRA claims and defenses also 
exacerbates the uncertainty of using a RFRA as a criminal defense. Although a significant 
                                                          
 69. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15. 
70. Id. at 35/25.   
71. See, e.g., World Outreach Conf. Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. Miller, 
570 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2009); Fam. Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 991 92 (N.D. Ill. 
2008); Marcavage v. City of Chi., 467 F. Supp.2d 823, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2006). See generally Irshad Learning Ctr. 
burdened under the Illinois RFRA); Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143 (Ill. 
the Church from building a new addition to its facilities). 
72. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001. 
73. See, e.g., Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 289 (Tex. 2009); Christian Acad. of Abilene v. City of 
S.W.3d 20, 23 (Tex. App. 2006); Walters v. Livingston, 519 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex. App. 2017); Scott v. State, 
80 S.W.3d 184, 187 .
2015); Emack v. State, 354 S.W.3d 828, 839 (Tex. App. 2011). 
74. See generally Vic Ryckaert, Mom who cited religious freedom pleads guilty, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Oct. 
28, 2016), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2016/10/28/mom-who-cited-religious-freedom-plead-
guilty-abuse/92876808 (stating that a mother who initially cited religious freedom as a defense in a child abuse 
prosecution pled guilty to battery, reducing her felony charge to a misdemeanor).  
 75. 
or regulation. However, the Texas RFRA operates differently for incarcerated people. In Texas, penological 
interests are automatically presumed to be compelling, thus the evidentiary burden of rebutting the compelling 
state interest shifts to the claimant. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 491. 
 76. IDAHO CODE § 73-403; see also 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/25; IND. CODE § 34-13-9-1. 
77. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 492. 
78. Id.   
 79. 71 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 2406(b)(3), (6). 
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number of states have codified the use of strict scrutiny for religious exercise claims, each 
80 For instance, some states only require a 
plaintiff to demonstrate a burden on the exercise of religion, while others require a plaintiff 
81 Further, when analyzing whether a burden is 
substantial, some courts still look to First Amendment jurisprudence.82 Applying a First 
Amendment analysis to RFRA claims or defenses is inherently problematic because, since 
the Smith ruling, First Amendment challenges cannot withstand laws that do not directly 
target religious conduct.83 In contrast, state RFRAs were introduced and enacted to impose 
strict scrutiny on government actions alleged to violate free exercise.84
In addition to differing applications of RFRAs across state courts, state courts even 
disagree on the threshold requirements for showing a substantial burden. How courts 
analyze substantial burdens is particularly important when determining RFRA violations 
because a such determination controls whether the burden of proof shifts to the 
government.85 For example, in a criminal case where a self-induced abortion caregiver is 
charged with the unauthorized practice of medicine, the state is not required to demonstrate 
that the law satisfies a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of 
achieving that interest until the caregiver first meets her evidentiary burden  that the 
application (i.e., charge) of the unauthorized practice of medicine imposes a substantial 
burden on the exercise of her religion.86
2. Applying State RFRAs in Criminal Defense Cases Requires Courts to Rely on 
Federal Sources of Authority 
When an individual asserts a state RFRA as a criminal defense, some state courts 
apply civil and criminal interpretations of the federal RFRA. While the limited availability 
of state RFRA case law certainly allows for the application of the federal RFRA in state 
RFRA cases, many local RFRA claims and defenses are brought in federal court alongside 
other claims that implicate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) and issues involving constitutional violations.87 As a result, when individuals 
bring a state RFRA claim or defense alongside other federal or constitutional issues, 
In addition, even when state RFRA claims are adjudicated in state court, judges sometimes 
                                                          
80. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 492. 
81. Id. at 477. 
 82. Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143, 1155 56  (Ill. App. 2009) (deciding 
that a special use permit code did not violate the Illinois RFRA statute based on the rational basis review-style 
reasoning under the  First Amendment claim). 
83.  Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997). 
84. A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 475 76. 
85. Id. at 478. 
 86. Id. at 488 89. 
87. See, e.g., Ross v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of N.M., 599 F.3d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir. 2010); World Outreach 
Conf. Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2009); 
Olsen v. Idaho St. Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2004); Shrum v. City of Coweta, 558 F. Supp. 2d 
1212, 1213 (E.D. Okla. 2008). 
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rely on statutory interpretations of the federal RFRA by federal courts. 88 Illinois, Idaho, 
and Indiana each provide good examples of how federal and state courts have applied 
federal RFRA case law to state RFRA defenses and claims. 
Federal courts in Illinois have determined how Illinois state courts ought to interpret 
brought in conjunction with federal RLUIPA claims or constitutional claims.89 The local 
Illinois RFRA or RLUIPA claims typically center on disputes regarding special land use 
permits.90 In one case, a Muslim religious and educational institute, Irshad Learning 
Center, sued multiple DuPage County boards after they refused to issue the center a 
conditional land use permit.91 In another Illinois RFRA action, a Lutheran church filed a 
denied the church a permit to build an addition to its sanctuary.92
Federal court decisions involving special land use permits and the Illinois RFRA 
turned on whether the claimant demonstrated that the government imposed a substantial 
burden on its free exercise of religion. In reviewing these cases, the Seventh Circuit 
pointed out that the Illinois RFRA does not contain any definition or guidance for 
interpreting what constitutes a substantial burden.93 As a result, the circuit court held that 
94
Although Illinois appellate courts have not 
interpreted when used as a criminal defense,95 it follows that if a criminal defendant were 
to assert the Illinois RFRA, Illinois state courts would likely look to interpretations of the 
federal RFRA statute.96
In areas where criminal defendants have used state RFRAs as a defense, state courts 
have relied on federal interpretations of RFRA in both the civil and criminal contexts. The 
Court of Appeals of Idaho has heard two cases in which individuals asserted the Idaho 
Free Exercise of Religion Protection Act (FERPA) as a criminal defense.97 The first 
                                                          
88. See State v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 733 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013); State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1219 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2011); Diggs v. Snyder, 775 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ill. 2002). 
89. See, e.g., Irshad Learning Ctr. v. Cty. of Dupage, 937 F. Supp. 2d 910, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Oak Grove 
Jubilee Ctr., Inc. v. City of Genoa, 808 N.E.2d 576, 579 (Ill. 2004). 
90. See, e.g., Irshad Learning Ctr., 937 F. Supp. 2d 910, 914; Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
Saville, 922 N.E.2d 1143, 1143  (Ill. App. 2009); Oak Grove Jubilee Ctr., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 968, 1020 21. 
91. Irshad Learning Ctr., 937 F. Supp. 2d at 914. 
92. Our Savior Evangelical Lutheran Church, 922 N.E.2d at 1145. 
93. World Outreach Conf. Ctr. v. City of Chi., 591 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Nelson v. Miller, 
570 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2009); Maum Meditation House of Truth v. Lake Cty. Ill., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1088 
(N.D. Ill. 2014). 
94. Maum Meditation House of Truth, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1088. See, e.g., World Outreach Conference Ctr.,
591 F.3d at 539; Miller, 570 F.3d at 880. 
95. See World Outreach Conference Ctr., 591 F.3d at 533; Miller, 570 F.3d at 880 (7th Cir. 2009); Fam. Life 
Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Baer-Stefanov v. White, 773 F. Supp. 2d 755, 
756 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 96. In some instances, federal courts have analyzed RFRA in the criminal context. See Oklevueha Native 
Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718 
(10th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 97. State v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 732 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013); State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1219 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2011).  
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instance, Idaho v. White, occurred in 2012. In White, the state charged a man with 
possession of marijuana and paraphernalia.98 White moved to dismiss the charge, asserting 
that the criminal drug possession and penalty laws substantially burdened his free exercise 
under FERPA.99 On appeal, the state appellate court acknowledged that case law 
e
state RFRA, it clearly intended to codify strict scrutiny as found in the federal RFRA.100
As a result, Idaho state courts may rely on federal interpretations of RFRA civil claims 
and apply those interpretations to RFRA criminal defense issues.101
The only o
bears a striking resemblance to White. In 2013, the Court of Appeals of Idaho heard Idaho 
v. Cordingley.102 Similar to White, Cordingley was arrested for possession of marijuana 
and paraphernalia; he asserted the Idaho FERPA as a defense.103 The court followed 
White’s reasoning relying, in part, on civil federal RFRA cases to interpret and apply the 
Idaho FERPA.104 In addressing the source of authority Idaho courts should use when 
interpreting a
105
B. When a Caregiver Asserts a State RFRA as a Defense, She Can Rely on the Supreme 
Court’s Hobby Lobby Ruling
1.
RFRA Civil Ruling Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
se to a 
criminal charge for tax evasion in Tyms-Bey v. State.106 The court confirmed that the 
Indiana RFRA applied to criminal proceedings and could be used as a criminal defense.107
In its analysis, the court adopted the approach of three pre-Smith federal cases to determine 
whether Indiana had a compelling interest in uniform and mandatory tax collection.108 The 
court also rejected Tyms-
                                                          
98. White, 271 P.3d at 1219. 
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1220. 
101. Id. at 1220 21. Specifically, the White
state interest test in the civil case Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service. In Navajo Nation, the Ninth Circuit held 
th
substantially burdened by [state] action, regardless of whether the burden results from a neutral law of general 
Cir. 2008). 
102. See Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730. 
103. Id. at 732. 
104. Id. at 735 36 (relying on Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 
592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979)). 
105. Id. at 733. 
106. Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d at 489. 
107. Id. at 489 90. 
108. Id. at 490 91 (citing U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 61 (1982); 
Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1989); Adams v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
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criminal charges for unpaid taxes should be considered when analyzing the least 
109 Instead, the court relied on federal 
RFRA criminal decisions from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and held that the mandatory 
payment of taxes ought to be considered as part of the least restrictive means analysis, as 
opposed to the criminal enforcement of the tax system.110 However, the dissenting judge 
application of the Indiana RFRA.111
In contrast to the majority opinion, the Tyms-Bey dissent referenced the Indiana 
RFRA statute, the Indiana Constitution, the history of First Amendment free-exercise 
112 The dissenting judge 
characterized the ma -Smith Supreme Court rulings as problematic 
because, prior to Smith, the courts did not require states to demonstrate that their means of 
so.113 In addition, prior to Smith, neutral laws of general applicability did not constitute a 
114 In contrast, the majority should have 
applied the controlling analysis presented in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.  one 
and infamous federal RFRA decisions. 
Hobby Lobby ruling was two-fold. First, the 
language in the Indiana RFRA mirrored the language of the federal RFRA statute, which 
the Supreme Court held in Hobby Lobby
-Smith free exercise jurisprudence.115 Second, the Hobby Lobby ruling 
-based approach to free 
exercise defenses, as opposed to pre-Smith rulings.116 Moreover, the Hobby Lobby
decision stipulated that the pre-Smith free-exercise cases were
violations and RFRA defenses is nonexistent.117 The dissenting judge concluded that 
because the Tyms-Bey -Smith free 
118
In addition to the dissent in Tyms-Bey, other state courts have also incorporated the 
Hobby Lobby ruling into state RFRA interpretations in civil cases.119 For example, in 
Merrick v. Penzone
                                                          
109. Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d. at 491 92. 
110. Id. at 491 (citing U.S. v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2016); U.S. v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1288
95 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
111. Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d at 492 (Najam, J. dissenting). 
112. Id. at 492 93. 
113. Id. at 493 94. 
114. Id. at 492 93. 
115. Id. 493 94. 
116. Tyms-Bey, 69 N.E.3d at 493 (Najam, J. dissenting). 
117. Id.
118. Id. at 499. 
119. See Merrick v. Penzone, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0505, 2017 WL 2242841, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 23, 2017); 
-00275, 2016 WL 5415484, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 15, 2016). 
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Arizona Free Exercise of Religion Act (FERA) claim against the Maricopa County sheriff 
and others.120 The incarcerated man claimed a FERA violation after personnel at the jail 
denied his request for unmonitored, unrecorded confessional telephone calls with his 
sibling, alleged to be a church elder.121 The Arizona appellate court held that the trial court 
i
an unmonitored confession.122
Arizona appellate court referenced the federal RFRA and quoted the Hobby Lobby
-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding 123
2. The Federal RFRA Analysis in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. is Advantageous to 
Caregivers 
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.124 The case 
involved three closely-held, for-profit corporations that asserted a federal RFRA claim 
against the federal government for requiring the coverage of certain contraceptive methods 
125 Specifically, the owners of 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Mardel Corporation, and Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corporation alleged that the contraceptive mandate violated their free exercise rights under 
the First Amendment and the federal RFRA because the mandate forced them to provide 
health insurance coverage for contraceptive methods they believed to be abortifacients. 
The owners of the corporations asserted that providing access to certain contraceptive 
they could not facilitate access to the contested contraceptive methods without spiritual 
impairment.126
eparation from First Amendment case 
127 In addition, the Court held that the contraceptive mandate constituted a substantial 
128 and that the government failed 
to meet its burden in showing that the mandate was the least restrictive means of furthering 
its compelling interest to provide female workers with cost-free contraception.129
merely echo First Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Alito contrasted First Amendment 
                                                          
120. Merrick, 2017 WL 2242841, at *1. 
121. Id.
122. Id. at *2. 
123. Id. at *3. Similarly, in Lebaron v. O’Brien, the Superior Court of Massachusetts also quoted Hobby 
Lobby
2016 WL 541544, at *5.  
124. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) 
125. Id. at 682. 
126. Id.
127. Id. at 696. 
128. Id. at 718 27. 
129. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 272 34. 
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free exercise case law with the modern provisions of the federal RFRA.130 He quoted Smith
and
applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental 
131
religi 132 Congress 
133 Thus, the Court affirmed that the federal 
134
In addition, the Court concluded that the contraceptive mandate constituted a 
135 In its reasoning, the 
Court described how economic penalties on RFRA claimants may constitute a substantial 
burden.136 If the three claimants refused to provide the mandated contraceptive coverage, 
each faced additional taxes resulting between $15 million and $475 million per year. The 
Court also carefully noted the role of courts in deciding what comprises a substantial 
burden. For instance, Courts may not determine whether a substantial burden exists on the 
137
Although the Hobby Lobby Court assumed the government had a compelling 
interest, it also held that the government did not meet the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest. In its decision, the Court noted that RFRA requires a narrow focus 
when determining whether the state has demonstrated a compelling government interest
138
139 Yet, the Court declined to adjudicate the compelling 
-free access to the . . . 
140
Instead, the Court reasoned that the government did not sufficiently demonstrate that its 
contraceptive mandate was the least restrictive means of advancing the compelling interest 
goal without i 141 Specifically, 
the Court suggested that the government must 
142
Hobby Lobby is advantageous to self-induced abortion caregivers asserting a state 
                                                          
130. Id. at 693 94. 
131. Id. at 694. 
132. Id.
133. Id. at 696; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
134. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 693. 
 135. Id. at 720. 
136. Id. at 720 21. 
137. Id. at 724. 
 138. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006). 
139. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726. 
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ruling. The majority opinion addresses several areas that previously generated differing 
RFRA analyses in the courts.143
First Amendment free exercise jurisprudence and RFRA,144 the place of the Court in 
145 the definition of 
exercise of religion,146 what comprises a substantial burden,147 and what constitutes a least 
restrictive means for the purposes of defeating a RFRA claim or defense.148
Further, Hobby Lobby’s assumption that the state possesses a compelling interest is 
particularly relevant. In a case where a caregiver is charged with the unauthorized practice 
of medicine for assisting with self-induced abortion, the state is likely to assert a 
compelling interest in public health, the life and health of the pregnant person, the 
preservation of potential life, or the maintenance of professionalism and ethics within the 
medical field. A cursory review of abortion cases bolsters this conclusion,149 and supports 
the view that courts would likely find a compelling state interest based on the state
assertions. Such an assumption forces a judicial inquiry to focus on whether charging 
Hobby Lobby’s
revious 
ambiguities regarding what constitutes a least restrictive means and clearly states that the 
government must show that other avenues of advancing its interest are not viable. 
IV. RFRAS ARE VIABLE DEFENSES FOR CAREGIVERS
A. Caregivers for Self-Induced Abortion May be Arrested and Prosecuted 
1.
Medical Practice 
Although abortion is legal and women have the constitutional right to choose an 
abortion, case law and statutes indicate that abortion is typically considered a medical 
procedure left to licensed physicians working in abortion clinics. Nevertheless, history 
shows that abortions have not been exclusively performed by physicians.150 Therefore, it 
is important to briefly address how abortion is unique in its medical history and in judicial 
review because these two factors have contributed to an environment in which law 
enforcement and prosecutors are able to utilize unauthorized medical practice laws to 
arrest and charge caregivers. 
Self-induced abortion and caregiving for self-induced abortion are not new 
phenomena. In the U.S., self-induced abortion and caregiving existed prior to colonization, 
                                                          
143. See A Look at State RFRAs, supra note 55, at 492. 
144. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 682, 692 94. 
145. Id. at 717 22. 
146. Id. at 694 97. 
147. Id. at 688 92. 
148. Id. at 728 30. 
149. See discussion infra
 150. LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME 71 (1997). 
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Indigenous 
women faced.151 There is also evidence of self-induced abortion within colonial 
152 In addition, 
prior to the criminalization of abortion, drugs to self-induce abortion were easily 
attainable, and pregnancy termination was not associated with religious or moral 
failings.153 154 and 
typically performed abortions before obstetrics and gynecology became a western medical 
practice.155 Even after its criminalization in the late-nineteenth century, midwives 
continued to perform abortions in relatively equal numbers with doctors.156 Taken 
together, all of these factors indicate that women have sought assistance with abortion 
outside of the formal healthcare industry for over a century.157
Although the American Medical Association (AMA) once led the campaign to 
criminalize abortion, the organization currently supports safe access to abortion.158 During 
the Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt hearings, the AMA joined the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 159
interference in the practice of medicine and oppose government regulation of medicine 
160
as a genuine public health issue, abortion still remains segregated from most medical 
practices. Although almost one-third of abortions at eight weeks of gestation or less are 
medically induced and require no surgical procedure,161 recent studies indicate that nearly 
                                                          
 151. Christina Rose, Native History: Roe v. Wade Passes, But Indigenous Women Lack Access, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY (Jan. 22, 2014), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/native-history-roe-v-wade-
passes-but-indigenous-women-lack-access-aPTclebqBkqJx-9OOHKwfQ/. 
 152. Katha Pollitt, Abortion in American History, ATLANTIC (May 1997), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/05/abortion-in-american-history/376851. 
 153. Jessica Ravitz, The Surprising History of Abortion in the United States, CNN (June 27, 2016, 10:52 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/health/abortion-history-in-united-states/index.html. 
 154. Obstetrics and gynecology, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/obstetrics. 
 155. Dutton-Kenny, supra note 7, at 21. 
 156. REAGAN, supra
157. Id. at 74. 
 158. As gynecology became a professional practice, physicians from the American Medical Association 
 Katha Pollitt, Abortion in American History, ATLANTIC (May 1997), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/05/abortion-in-american-history/376851. See also Dutton-
Kenny, supra note 7, at 22. 
 159. Ravitz, supra note 153. 
160. Id.
 161. Typically, a medication abortion is non-invasive and requires no surgical procedure. The most common 
type of medication abortion involves the use of two medications, mifepristone and misoprostol. According to the 
pregnancy. Medication Abortion, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/medication-abortion. After taking mifepristone, the 
patient takes misoprostol, which induces an early miscarriage and empties the uterus. In some states, the abortion 
18
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sixty percent of abortions are performed in specialized abortion clinics, as opposed to 
162 Further, a limited number of physicians possess 
experience with the practice because abortion is rarely taught in medical schools.163
choose to terminate a pregnancy by age forty-five.164 Accordingly, abortio
to specialized clinics only exacerbates the legal liabilities caregivers face because women 
will continue to need access to abortion but may not access it through a clinic. 
Abortion case law also supports the assertion that abortion is squarely placed within 
the realm of professional medical care, leading to legal uncertainties for caregivers. For 
providers.165 In Roe v. Wade, arguments presented by the medical field seemed to shape 
choose abortion.166 Despite the presence of feminist and right-to-life voices in amicus 
briefs filed to the Roe d mainly responsive to the 
167 Indeed, the reasoning in Roe is based on medical 
168 Prior to the Roe decision, the legal 
169 Further, although the language of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
does not explicitly silo the practice of abortion to the medical industry, it provided that 
states may regulate abortion clinics and may prohibit clinics from performing abortions at 
                                                          
can be completed at home. Id. Later, the patient returns to the clinic or physician for a follow-up appointment to 
confirm termination of the pregnancy. 
and almost always completely effective. Id. In addition, the risk of major complication is less than five percent 
Id.
 162. Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2014,
GUTTMACHER INST.  (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/journals/psrh/2017/01/abortion-incidence-
and-service-availability-united-states-2014. 
 163. See Carrie Feibel, Can Doctors Learn to Perform Abortions Without Doing One?, NPR (June 21, 2016 
3:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/06/21/481774579/can-doctors-learn-to-perform-
abortions-without-doing-one (quoting a senior doctor and medical professor that while the procedure for an 
elective abortion is the same as that for a miscarriage, -
The Scarcity of Abortion Training in American’s Medical Schools, ATLANTIC (June 9, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/learning-abortion-in-medical-school/395075. 
164. Abortion Is a Common Experience for U.S. Women Despite Dramatic Declines in Rates, GUTTMACHER 
INST. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2017/abortion-common-experience-us-women-
despite-dramatic-declines-rates. 
165. See 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U
 166. LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION 
DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT S RULING, at vii (2012), 
http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/beforeroe2nded_1.pdf. 
167. Id. at viii. 
168. Id. at viii, ix. 
169. Id. at 4. 
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viability.170 Thus, the Casey
remain within the realm of medical practice. 
to the 
which caregivers may be charged with crimes such as the unauthorized practice of 
medicine. Among legal scholars,171
tendency of legislatures and courts to subject abortion to unique, and uniquely burdensome 
172
173
Abortion laws in the U.S. demonstrate that most legislatures limit lawful abortion 
practice to the medical field. Currently, nineteen states forbid the practice of abortion 
outside of hospital setting after specified points in the pregnancy.174 For instance, forty-
two states require an abortion to be performed by a licensed physician.175 Specifically, the 
or any substance to a person with the intent of terminating her pregnancy, unless that 
176 The Idaho Code also 
177 ion in all instances shall be a 
circumstances.178 The Illinois abortion statute also forbids non-physicians from 
performing abortions.179 Further, nineteen states require that clinicians providing 
medication abortions be physically present during the administration of abortion 
medication, thereby prohibiting the use of telemedicine and limiting access to abortion in 
rural areas.180 As a result, law enforcement and prosecutors are easily able to use medical 
care laws to incriminate caregivers. 
2. Law Enforcement and Prosecutors May Arrest and Charge Caregivers by Using 
Laws Intended to Protect the Public Health 
How unauthorized practice of medicine laws define medical practice and pregnancy 
provides law enforcement and prosecutors with opportunities to arrest and charge 
                                                          
 170. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 874. 
171. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1047, 1048 (2014), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss2/13 (citing Ian Vandewalker, 
Abortion and Informed Consent, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2012); Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion 
Distortion, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2014)). 
172. Id. at 1048. 
173. Id. (quoting Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2012)). 
174. An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-
policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws. 
175. Id.
 176. IDAHO CODE § 18-605(1). 
177. Id. at § 18-608(A). 
 178. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1; accord KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.750; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(b)(1). 
 179. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/3.1. 
180. Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-
policy/explore/medication-abortion.   
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caregivers. Indiana law broadly defines the practice of medicine to include holding oneself 
181 Further, 
 . . without 
182 Going further than the statute provides, Indiana 
courts have declared that midwifery en . . . throughout pre-
183 is not a medical 
practice and that pregnancy should be treated by physicians.184 Similarly, Illinois courts 
have held that pregnancy is considered a condition unde
of 1987,185  . . of 
186
Medical Practice Act is guilty of a felony, which is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 
or imprisonment from one to three years.187
Currently, the number of caregivers arrested and charged with the unauthorized 
practice of medicine is unknown. However, prosecutors have brought a variety of charges 
against women who choose to self-induce abortion.188 Women who have self-induced have 
faced charges including the unlawful practice of medicine,189 solicitation of murder,190
feticide,191 attempted homicide,192 and abuse of a corpse and concealing a birth.193 These 
prosecutions often occur in the absence of any statute that expressly prohibits self-induced 
abortion,194
administering their own reproductive healthcare. 
Considering that women who self-induce abortion are prosecuted under medical 
practice laws and abortion statutes, it is not wholly inconceivable that law enforcement 
                                                          
 181. IND. CODE § 25-22.5-8-1. 
 182. Id.
 183. Mary J. Renfrew et al., Midwifery: An Executive Summary for The Lancet’s Series 3, LANCET (June 
2014), http://www.thelancet.com/pb/assets/raw/Lancet/stories/series/midwifery/midwifery_exec_summ.pdf. 
184. See Smith v. State ex rel. Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind., 459 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
 185. Illinois v. Bickham, 621 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
 186. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/49. 
 187. Id. at 60/59.  
 188. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2012); Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra
 189. Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 17. 
190. In re J.M.S., 280 P.3d 410, 411 (Utah 2011); see also Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 14. 
 191. Patel v. Indiana, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
 192. Christine Hauser, Tennessee Woman Accused of Coat-Hanger Abortion Attempt Faces New Charges,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/us/tennessee-woman-accused-of-coat-
hanger-abortion-faces-new-charges.html; see also Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 16.   
 193. Anne Bynum, who was charged with abuse of a corpse and sentenced for concealing a birth, did not 
intend to terminate her own pregnancy. Patty Wooten, Judge acquits woman of abuse of a corpse, jury convicts 
her of concealing birth, SEAARK TODAY (Mar. 6, 2016), http://searktoday.com/judge-acquits-woman-of-abuse-
of-corpse-jury-convicts-her-of-concealing-birth. Instead, she took abortion medication to induce early labor in 
an effort to give birth without the knowledge of her family and place the baby for adoption. Id. However, 
-induce 
regardless of whether they intend to terminate a pregnancy or give birth. See also Letter to U.N. Working Group, 
supra note 1, at 18.   
 194. Only a limited number of states expressly outlaw self-induced abortion. See Letter to U.N. Working 
Group, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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and prosecutors would pursue charges against a caregiver. Indeed, attorneys are currently 
assessing the legal risks to caregivers and mapping out criminal charges that caregivers 
may confront.195 For instance, full-spectrum doulas trained professional[s] who provide 
. . 196and abortion 
hotline workers risk being charged with the unauthorized practice of medicine because 
they often operate outside of the formal healthcare system.197 In states without midwifery 
medicine . . 198 However, caregivers are not necessarily limited to those 
with an interest or vocation in abortion practice. For the purposes of the present issue, 
caregivers are more broadly defined to include friends, family, or religious and spiritual 
leaders who may assist a pregnant person in self-induced abortion. 
In 2014, Whalen, a mother of three living in Pennsylvania, was convicted of a felony after 
providing her teenage daughter with abortion medication in 2012.199
a sixteen-year-old with an unplanned pregnancy, intended to undergo an abortion at a 
traditional clinic. However, access to the nearest clinic required her to wait twenty-four 
hours after her initial counseling session and would have resulted in a 300-mile trip within 
a two-day period.200 -of-pocket cost of 
at least $300. Facing geographic and monetary limitations, Whalen agreed to purchase 
abortion pills for her daughter.201
experienced stomach pains. Although this is a common side effect of abortion medication 
and typically indicates that the miscarriage is complete,202 ter asked to go 
to the hospital.203 The hospital sent Whalen and her daughter home without any 
intervention or complications. Although the hospital did not mention any legal risks to 
Whalen, it reported her to state child-protective services. Later, police s
house and identified the box that contained the abortion pills.204 Two years after her 
                                                          
 195. SIA LEGAL TEAM, Making Abortion a Crime (Again): How Extreme Prosecutors Attempt to Punish 
People for Abortions in the U.S., https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/aa251a_09c00144ac5b4bb997637bc3ac2c7259 
.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
 196. DONA INT L, What is a doula?, https://www.dona.org/what-is-a-doula/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2018). 
197.  SIA LEGAL TEAM, supra note 195. 
 198. Catherine Elton, American Women: Birthing Babies at Home, TIME (Sept. 4, 2010), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2011940,00.html. See also Smith v. State ex rel. Med. 
Licensing Bd. of Ind., 459 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
 199. Emily Bazelon, A Mother in Jail for Helping Her Daughter Have an Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/magazine/a-mother-in-jail-for-helping-her-daughter-have-an-abor 
tion.html; Quinn Cummings, Making Abortions Illegal Doesn’t Make Them Go Away, TIME (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://time.com/3423785/illegal-abortions/; David DeKok, Pennsylvania mother who gave daughter abortion pill 
gets prison, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2014, 11:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-pennsylvania-
abortion/pennsylvania-mother-who-gave-daughter-abortion-pill-gets-prison-idUSKBN0H10IR20140906. 
 200. See Bazelon, supra note 199. 
201. Id.
 202. FDA, Mifeprex (mifepristone) tablets label 7,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/020687s020lbl.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
 203. See Bazelon, supra note 199. 
204. Id.
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medical consultation without a medical license. The District Attorney also charged 
Whalen with other crimes including dispensing drugs without a pharmacy license. In a 
205 Although the judge 
could have given Whalen probation, he sentenced her to up to eighteen months in jail.206
Georgia woman who was arrested and jailed for taking abortion pills without a prescription 
or administration from a physician.207 After attempting to self-induce abortion with 
medication, Kenlissia Jones prematurely gave birth on her way to the hospital. Shortly 
eath of the fetus.208 Although 
 . 
 for their actions relating to an illegal 
209
prosecutors will charge caregivers and may use unauthorized practice of medicine laws to 
do so. 
B. Applying Hobby Lobby Allows a Caregiver to Successfully Assert a State RFRA as a 
Defense to Criminal Charges 
1. Under Hobby Lobby, Caregiving Meets the Definition of a Sincerely Held 
Religious Belief. 
Although statutes that expressly criminalize self-induced abortion are 
unconstitutional and prosecutions against women who self-induce are tenuous,210
caregivers may not have similar constitutional protections because they are not unduly 
burdened in accessing abortion for themselves.211 Accordingly, caregivers who assist 
women in self-inducing abortion require adequate legal safeguards. While there are likely 
a number of litigation strategies that could assist caregivers in their criminal defense, state 
RFRAs may be the most beneficial to caregivers who assist with self-induced abortion 
from a religious or spiritual perspective. 
To successfully assert a state RFRA as a defense, the caregiver must first show that 
she assisted in the provision of a self-induced abortion because of a sincerely held religious 
                                                          
205. Id.
206. Id.
 207. Abby Phillip, Murder charges dropped against a Georgia woman jailed for taking abortion pills, WASH.




 210. Letter to U.N. Working Group, supra note 1, at 9. 
 211. In Planned Parenthood an undue burden on a 
ruling, the Court did not discuss the possibility of an undue burden for a third party, or even for a physician, to 
perform or assist with an abortion. As a result, this paper does not assume that the undue burden standard applies 
to caregivers who assist a person with self-induced abortion.   
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belief. The caregiver can satisfy the first element of RFRA for three reasons. First, under 
Hobby Lobby
religious beliefs.212
reasonableness standard.213 Finally, courts have experience ascertaining whether a 
214 and therefore could easily determine whether a 
caregiver was asserting RFRA as a means to simply shirk responsibility from criminal or 
civil penalties. 
The idea that a caregiver may assist in self-induced abortion because of her religious 
beliefs may seem novel, but the Hobby Lobby religious exercise 
under RFRA allows for this possibility. In Hobby Lobby, the Court noted that, prior to the 
First Amendment case law.215
definition of exercise of religion expanded because Congress incorporated RLU
definition of the phrase into the RFRA statute.216 Today, religious exercise under RFRA 
217 The Hobby Lobby Court also held that the exercise of religion is not 
218
219 Thus, the 
us dogma or text. So 
long as a religious or spiritual belief motivates her actions or she is assisting with self-
induced abortion as a religious or spiritual leader, her assistance constitutes an exercise of 
religion. 
sincerity of religious belief supports RFRA protections for caregivers. In Hobby Lobby,
religious beliefs.220 However, the government did imply that the reasonableness of the 
gove
221
In contrast to d
sincere, the Hobby Lobby
                                                          
 212. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 682 (2014) 
213. Id. at 724 25. 
214. Id. at 717 18. 
215. Id. at 713 15. 
 216. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
 217. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
 218. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 713 15. 
219. Id.
220. Id. at 717 18. 
221. Id. at 724 25  
24
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222 Indeed, this is a sentiment 
expressed i 223 For 
instance, although the Court in Smith did not side with participants of the Native American 
of a religious claim.224 Hobby Lobby
placing abortion in a religious context may seem unreasonable to those whose religious 
beliefs warn against access to non-therapeutic abortion. Even among pro-choice 
-understood. 
religious 
beliefs are sincere. 
In a case where a caregiver is charged with a crime, it is her burden to establish that 
her religious or spiritual belief to assist with self-induced abortion is sincere. Regarding 
Hobby Lobby
held that prior case law substantially catalogs the ability of courts to determine when a 
sserted religious beliefs act as a façade for simply choosing not 
to conform to civil or criminal law. For example, a pretextual assertion of religious 
freedom may include an exemption that provides the claimant with significant financial 
benefits.225 Feigni
segregation during his incarceration.226 However, the caregiver should not rely on 
assumptions that the court will not question her sincerity. Instead, she can assert that her 
religious belief is sincere, and she can support her assertion with an explanation of 
her position to others who are similarly situated. 
Evidence that religious beliefs may motivate a caregiver to assist with self-induced 
abortion is not wanting. Prior to the legalization of abortion under Roe v. Wade, religious 
and spiritual leaders helped women access safe, anonymous abortions.227 Many religious 
leaders formed a network known as the Clergy Consultation Service and operated across 
the U.S. to ensure that women were able to safely access the procedure.228 In New York, 
                                                          
222. Id.
 223. See
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.  
224. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. 
 225. 
 226. Ochs v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 227. Sarah McCammon, 50 Years Ago, A Network of Clergy Helped Women Seeking Abortion, NPR: ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED (May 19, 2017, 4:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/19/529175737/50-years-ago-a-
network-of-clergy-helped-women-seeking-abortion. 
228. Id; see also Grace Wong, Before Roe v. Wade, Chicago Clergy Helped Women end Unwanted 
Pregnancies, CHI. TRIB. (May 19, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-abortion-clergy-group-met-
20170519-story.html. 
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Protestant pastors as well as some 229 The Clergy Consultation Service 
formed in 1967 and, in addition to ensuring safe access to abortion, members counseled 
women in their decisions to terminate their pregnancies.230
Even after its legalization, clergy and other religious leaders continued to actively 
support access to abortion through organizations like the national Religious Coalition for 
Reproductive Choice (RCRC), which formed out of the Clergy Consultation Service.231
Today, RCRC provides educational and pastoral training 
theologians to break the stigma of abortion . . 232 Specifically, 
RCRC offers pastoral care training so that clergy and other religious leaders may 
233 In the training, 
perspectives on reproductive decision-  decisions are often only 
234 Other religious groups 
and congregations supporting access to abortion include Catholics for Choice,235 Judson 
Memorial Church,236 National Council of Jewish Women,237 Methodist Federation for 
Social Action,238 Presbyterian Feminist Agenda Network,239 United Church of Christ,240
and Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations.241
religious leaders, congregations, and faith-based organizations have expressed that access 
to abortion is a religious and moral imperative. In 1971, a number of ethical and religious 
organizations joined together in a motion to file an amici curiae brief to oppose the laws 
 . . 
her own conscience in the conduct of . . 
in the conduct of his or her 
                                                          
 229. McCammon, supra note 227. 
230. Id.
 231. History, RELIGIOUS COAL. FOR REPROD. CHOICE, http://rcrc.org/history (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
232. Id.
 233. Pastoral Care Training, RELIGIOUS COAL. FOR REPROD. CHOICE, http://rcrc.org/pastoral-care, (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
234. Id.
235. See





 240. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, GENERAL SYNOD STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS REGARDING FREEDOM 
OF CHOICE 1 (1971), http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/unitedchurchofchrist/legacy_url/2038/GS-
Resolutions-Freedon-of-Choice.pdf?1418425637 (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 241. Right to Choose: 1987 General Resolution, UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASS N,
https://www.uua.org/action/statements/right-choose (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
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address the role of religion in abortion access and decision-making. In Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, Catholics for a Free Choice, Chicago Catholic Women, the 
National Coalition of American Nuns, and the Women of Spirit in Colorado Task Force 
filed a brief in support of Reproductive Health Services.242 In the brief, the organizations 
243
probabl[e] opinion in favor of 
liberty . . . although the opinion in favor of the law is more probable I may use the former 
244 Thus, the writers asserted that issues regarding moral 
decision-
conscious choice is supreme. Bas
or imperative to assist with self-induced abortion resides within herself and she must 
follow that decision. 
Most recently, theologians and a number of religious organizations and 
congregations discussed religious support for access to abortion. In Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, more than fifteen religious organizations submitted a brief in support 
245 In the brief, the religious organizations and congregations 
state that there is not a unified religious or moral position on abortion, even among major 
religions.246
impinges on the religious and moral decisions of some individuals. Theologians, ethicists, 
and those who teach theology across a wide spectrum of religions also submitted a brief 
247
er theological 
for unsafe abortion procedures.248
demonstrate a religious imperative to assist with abortion. However, a number of religious 
followers and leaders have expressed that they support access to abortion because of their 
religion. Often, there is an assumption that people of faith who support access to abortion 
249 In addition, there is typically an assumption that there 
                                                          
242. See Brief for Catholics for a Free Choice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), 1989 WL 1127718. 
243. Id. at 5. 
244. Id. at 20. 
245. See supra note 235. 
 246. Id. at 3. 
 247. 
563 (2015) (No. 15-272), 2015 WL 9610345. 
 248. Id. at 1, 3. Ultimately, the amici curiae brief on behalf of the theologians and ethicists was filed in support 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. However, at the time of the initial filings 
in 2015, Kirk Cole served as the Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services. 
SCOTUSBLOG, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/whole-
womans-health-v-cole (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). By the time the case reached the Supreme Court in 2016, 
John Hellerstedt served as the Commissioner of the Texas Department of State Health Services. Id.
 249. Katey Zeh, The Intersections of Faith and Reproductive Justice, FEMINISM AND RELIGION (July 18, 
2017), https://feminismandreligion.com/2017/07/18/the-intersections-of-faith-and-reproductive-justice-by-kate 
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faith.250 However, religious leaders and groups have argued that their support for abortion 
access is 
as the belief that reproductive rights are an important element of religious leadership.251
 . re
compromised.252 Specifically, some rabbis state that the Jewish community has a 
253 commands [people] to respect [their] 
254
255
But the story of Dr. Willie Parker provides the most compelling evidence that 
individuals may assist with abortion due to religious or spiritual imperative. Dr. Parker 
holds a degree from the University of Iowa College of Medicine as well as degrees from 
the Harvard School of Public Health, the University of Cincinnati, and the University of 
Michigan.256 Recently, the United Nations Office of Human Rights recognized him as one 
257 But most importantly, Dr. Parker is a 
devout Christian who chooses to provide abortions in high-need communities because of 
his religious convictions.258
For much of his young life, Dr. Parker identified as a fundamentalist Christian and 
wrote about abortio - 259 Indeed, Dr. Parker refused to perform 
abortions for the first half of his career as an OB/GYN.260 As part of his profession, he 
referred patients seeking abortion to appropriate providers, but believed that performing 
abortions himself was wrong. However, he describes his transition from fundamentalist 
261 When a 
series of life events forced Dr. Parker to reflect on his stance toward abortion, he found 
Rev
moving.262 Although Dr. Parker had heard the sermon countless times, one specific 
-care services 
                                                          
y-zeh. 
250. Id.
 251. Lori Weinstein & Rabbi Michael Nammath, Our Jewish beliefs call us to advocate for reproductive 




  254. Id.
255. Id.
 256. About Dr. Parker, DR. WILLIE PARKER, https://www.drwillieparker.com/about (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). 
257. Id.
258. Id. Dr. Parker provides abortions in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. Currently, 
Mississippi has only one abortion clinic. 
 259. DR. WILLIE PARKER, LIFE S WORK: A MORAL ARGUMENT FOR CHOICE 2, 24 25 (2017). 
260. Id. at 26. 
261. Id. at 2.   
262. Id. at 34. 
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they s 263 As he reflected, 
Dr. Parker found the story of the Good Samaritan analogous to a calling to provide abortion 
services.264 In discussing this transition, Dr. Parker writes: 
The Scripture came alive and it spoke to me. For the Samaritan, the person in need was a 
fallen traveler. For me, it was a pregnant woman. The earth spun, and with it, this question 
turned on its head. It became not: Is it right for me, as a Christian, to perform abortions? But 
rather: Is it right for me, as a Christian, to refuse to do them? And in that instant, I understood 
that I, like the Levite and the priest, had been afraid afraid of what my Christian brothers 
and sisters might think of me, of what my pastors and relatives . . . might say, of what the 
social or political consequences of fully embracing the cause of abortion might be.265
Today, Dr. Parker describes his work as an abortion provider as a calling, despite 
the abashment of his Christian opponents.266 In discussing h
Christian, raised in the churches right here in the South . . . I remain a follower of Jesus. 
267
actions similar to 
 historical 
acceptance of abortion, alongside outspoken support for making religious beliefs and 
practice inclusive of abortion today, there is a strong indication that a caregiver could 
demonstrate that her assistance with self-induced abortion is based on a sincere religious 
belief
judge, or jury is completely irrelevant, as the Hobby Lobby
religious beliefs and practices are not required to meet a reasonableness standard.268
2.
Exercise 
After the caregiver shows she acted because of her sincerely held religious beliefs, 
the caregiver must demonstrate that the criminal charges she faces pose a substantial 
burden on her religious exercise. In Hobby Lobby
comply with the contraceptive mandate.269 To the Court, the cumulative financial penalties 
constituted a substantial burden because they made the practice of the cl
beliefs more expensive.270 Hence, it is equally acceptable to find that a state imposes a 
and economic livelihood at risk. 
Recall the story of Jennifer Whalen the mother of three who purchased abortion 
                                                          
 263. Id. at 35. 
264. PARKER, supra note 259, at 35. 
265. Id. at 36. 
266. Id. at 2. 
267. Id. at 1 2.
 268. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 25 (2014). 
269. Id. at 718 22. 
270. Id.
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271
Although Whalen did not assert RFRA as a defense, her prosecution and subsequent 
incarceration are indicative of the burdens a caregiver would likely experience. First, 
her liberty with an affirmative defense or pleading guilty and losing her livelihood.272 If 
Whalen pled guilty to the misdemeanors of assault and endangering the welfare of a child, 
she would receive less jail time. But, in addition to incarceration, she would automatically 
lose her position as a personal-care aide at an assisted living facility a source of income 
on which her family depended.273 Ultimately, Whalen pled guilty to the misdemeanor 
charges and was sentenced to jail with work-release.274 Along with the economic costs, 
Whalen experienced a great deal of unwanted and unwarranted attention. After her arrest, 
bloggers, reporters, and pro-choice activists bombarded her with phone calls. 
life her family resides in a rural, conservative area where she has lived her entire life.275
Similar to Whalen, a caregiver would likely face economic penalties and loss of 
liberty. If a caregiver is charged and sentenced to prison for the unauthorized practice of 
medicine, she likely encounters fines relating to the violation of the statute276 as well as 
fees relating to imprisonment, court costs, community service, and bail.277 In addition to 
expenses directly related to her criminal charges, a caregiver would also likely endure the 
collateral consequences of incarceration job loss, civil forfeiture, and limitation of 
welfare benefits.278
her religious exercise because it limits her ability to assist women with self-induced 
abortion. If a caregiver is incarcerated, she is not able to act as a Good Samaritan by 
ordering abortion pills or traditional herbs and by ensuring that such treatments are taken 
in a safe and effective manner. Thus, Hobby Lobby’s penalty-based reasoning provides 
that the requirements for what constitutes a substantial burden are met simply by a 
3. Abortion Case Law Provides that the State has a Compelling Interest 
After a caregiver demonstrates that the state imposed a substantial burden on her 
religious exercise, the prosecution must show that the state had a compelling interest in 
doing so. Although the Court in Hobby Lobby assumed the government had a compelling 
interest to ensure the provision of cost-free contraception to female workers, it remarked 
that broadly formulated government interests, such as public health or gender equality, are 
                                                          




275. See Bazelon, supra note 199. 
276. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
of medicine statute may face a fine of up to $10,000 for their first offense). 
 277. See Salma S. Safiedine & K. Jeannie Chung, The Price for Justice: The Economic Barriers That 
Contribute to an Unfair and Unjust Criminal Justice System, 32 CRIM. JUST. 40, 44 (2018). 
 278. See Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, 16 CRIM. JUST. 32 (2001). 
30
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss3/8
2019] RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 521 
not emblematic of a compelling state interest.279 Instead, the compelling interest inquiry 
requires a more narrow examination.280 When the government asserts a compelling interest 
for substan religious exercise, the 
281
assertion that harm will result from granting the claimant or defendant a religious 
exemption from the law.282
When a caregiver is prosecuted, the government could assert that the harm resulting 
from her religious exemption is the risk of medical complications or death to the person 
who chooses to self-induce. Indeed, abortion was legalized in part because of the high 
mortality rates associated with illegal abortions that were unsanitary and not properly 
performed by physicians.283 However, the advent and increased usage of medication 
abortion allows for caregivers to safely assist people with abortion outside of a clinical 
setting.284
In a study on self-induced abortion, the use of abortion med
commonly reported method among women who reported knowing someone who had 
-induced abortion.285 Similar to many medications, abortion pills include a 
list of side effects such as nausea, vomiting, weakness, or dizziness.286 Yet, the most recent 
data indicates that when abortion medication is taken properly, serious adverse reactions 
occur in less than one percent of individuals.287 Further, over ninety-seven percent of 
pregnancies treated with abortion pills successfully terminate.288 After taking the abortion 
medication, less than three percent of people are required to undergo additional abortion 
procedures to end the pregnancy.289
in preventing medical complications or death would be minimized if individuals could 
legally obtain legitimate abortion pills. But currently, access to abortion medication in the 
U.S. is limited to physician prescriptions.290 Without additional information on how many 
people who self-induce actually receive legitimate abortion medication, it is far too 
                                                          
 279. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 25 (2014). 
280. Id.
281. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430 31 (2006)). 
282. Id. (relying on Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 431).   
 283. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
 284. D. Grossman, K White, & L. Fuentes et al., Knowledge, Opinion and Experience Related to Abortion 
Self-Induction in Texas, TEX. POL Y EVALUATION PROJECT RES. BRIEF 1 (Nov. 17, 2015) [hereinafter 
Knowledge, Opinion, and Experience ]; Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/print/evidence-you-can-use/medication-abortion. See also Mifeprex Medication 
Guide, stating that althou  . . There 
Mifeprex Medication Guide,
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/UCM088643.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
285. Knowledge, Opinion, and Experience, supra note 284, at 3. 
 286. FDA, Mifeprex (Mifepristone) Label 7 (2016), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/020687s020lbl.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
287. Id. at 7 8.
288. Id. at 13 tbl.3. 
289. Id.
 290. Mifeprex (mifepristone) Information, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm111323.htm 
(last updated Jan. 23, 2018); Knowledge, Opinion, and Experience, supra note 284, at 3. 
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ambitious to conclude that a court would not find a compelling interest in preventing 
medical complications or death in people who choose to self-induce with abortion pills 
purchased via internet or through mail-order. 
Abortion exceptionalism further complicates the compelling state interest analysis 
through the lens of abortion case law.291 In Roe, the Court held that during the first 
trimester of a pregnancy, the state has no compelling interest and the abortion decision 
292 But, at later stages of 
pregnancy, the state has a compelling interest in seeing that abortion is performed under 
circumstances that ensure maximum safety for the patient.293
properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical 
294
While Roe articulated the need for a state to have a compelling interest in regulating 
abortion beyond the first trimester, later cases depressed the Roe holding and eventually 
abandoned the practice of applying strict scrutiny to all abortion regulations. In Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, the Court held that the state has a compelling interest in 
protecting fetal life from the moment of conception.295 Building on the Webster ruling, the 
Casey ntial life and may 
regulate abortion at the earliest stages of pregnancy, so long as the regulation does not 
296
profound interests also allow it to regulate abortion to protect the health and safety of the 
individual.297 Most recently, the Court echoed previous cases when it held that states are 
not required to assert a compelling interest for abortion regulations to be constitutional. In 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Co
interest in seeing to it that abortion . . . is performed under circumstances that insure 
obstacle to a woman seeking 298
likely violate existing abortion restrictions, it is unclear whether a court would require the 
                                                          
291. See supra 
constitutional claims other than . . 
analyze these constitutional claims or they have even completely foreclosed the application of other doctrines on 
Abortion 
Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2014). In the context of 
apply to constitutional claims brought alongside abortion rights violations. However, it is not inconceivable that 
a caregiver asserting a RFRA as a defense would also assert a First Amendment free exercise violation, or even 
a violation of abortion rights based on privacy. In such a case, the actual level of scrutiny the court may apply to 
the RFRA claim is very uncertain. 
 292. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 63 (1973). 
 293. Id. at 154, 163. 
294. Id. at 154 
 295. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 494 (1989). 
 296. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 78 (1992). 
297. Id.
 298. Whole Woman Roe, 410 U.S. at 150). 
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state to demonstrate a compelling interest or to only articulate a legitimate interest. 
Moreover, a court may review abortion jurisprudence and find a compelling state interest 
in protecting the life and health of the pregnant person or preserving potential human life. 
Because courts have been inconsistent in the standard of review they apply, great caution 
is warranted, as is a conservative approach when predicting whether the court will find a 
compelling state interest. 
4. Arresting and Prosecuting Caregivers is Not the Least Restrictive Means 
Although a court could conclude that the state has a compelling interest, the state 
must also show that it is furthering its interest by the least restrictive means possible. To 
desired 299 In 
Hobby Lobby, the Court assumed the government had a compelling interest in substantially 
religious exercise. However, the government did not satisfy the 
least restrictive means standard because it did not anticipate other ways of furthering its 
interest and did not demonstrate why those alternatives would have been unworkable.300
To show that any substitute means of furthering its interests was unfeasible, the 
government could have used empirical evidence. Such evidence might include an 
 . 
301
Absent any proposal from the government, the Court suggested two alternatives to 
the contraceptive mandate. First, the Court speculated that the government could fund the 
cost of the four contraceptive methods at issue. While the government argued that RFRA 
cannot be used to create new programs, the Court rejected this reasoning and held that 
 . . may in some circumstances require the Government to expend additional funds 
302 Second, the Court pointed out that the 
govern
303 The government had already provided nonprofit religious organizations 
with a religious exemption for contraceptive coverage.304 The Court held that the religious 
to female employees.305
When a state prosecutes and penalizes a caregiver who assists with self-induced 
abortion due to religious motivations, it is not furthering its compelling interest by the least 
restrictive means possible. While the state may have a compelling interest, it can 
simultaneously ensure that religious exercise is not burdened and that pregnant people are 
                                                          
 299. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 727 28 (2014). 
300. Id.
301. Id. at 727 30   
302. Id. at 729 30. 
303. Id. at 730 32. 
304. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 730 32. 
305. Id.
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protected. Although the caregiver is not obligated to demonstrate alternative means by 
which the state could further its compelling interest, it is worth exploring what avenues 
the state could take to do so. 
Because access to abortion medication is highly restricted, states do not have the 
authority to broaden how abortion medication is prescribed and dispensed.306  However, a 
state can mitigate potential harms and meet its compelling interest by creating an 
exemption for religiously-motivated caregiving either under existing abortion statutes or 
under existing medical licensure regulations. Although there are no laws granting religious 
exemptions specifically for self-induced abortion caregivers, many states offer religious 
exemptions to withhold from otherwise mandatory medical treatments. For instance, 
despite recent outbreaks of measles and mumps,307 many immunization statutes allow for 
religious exemptions.308 In addition, eighteen states grant philosophical exemptions for 
individuals who object to vaccinations due to a moral or personal belief.309
Some states also offer religious exemptions from medical licensure in certain 
situations, which indicates that prosecuting caregivers for administering traditional herbs 
or abortion medication is not the least restrictive means of preventing medical 
e practice of the religious tenets of any church in 
and Occupations Code.310
religious exemption to practice 
311 However, some states that 
                                                          
 306. DANCO LABS., LLC, Mifeprex Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/rems/Mifeprex_2016-03-29_REMS_full.pdf. 
least restrictive means to protecting the health of people who undergo self-induced abortion would manifest 
provide that pharmacists may prescribe and dispense abortion medication to any person in need of it. A state 
could ostensibly couple this strategy with the Hobby Lobby -pays proposal. Because RFRAs 
 a state could subsidize the 
cost of abortion medication through its Medicaid program in order to guarantee that poverty is not a barrier to 
safe and effective medication. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 729 30. However, only a physician who is certified 
y program can prescribe and dispense the medication. 
DANCO LABS., LLC, Mifeprex Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/rems/Mifeprex_2016-03-29_REMS_full.pdf. Further, in some 
states, a person must take the first pill of two in the physical presence of a clinician. Medication Abortion,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/medication-abortion. 
While the ACLU is currently challenging the federal government
expectation that states can expand pharmacy dispensation laws to encompass the medication is currently 
unworkable. ACLU, ACLU Challenges Federal Restrictions on Abortion Pill (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-challenges-federal-restrictions-abortion-pill. 
 307. NAT L CONF. OF ST. LEGS., LegisBrief: Vaccination Policies: Requirements and Exemptions for Entering 
School 1 (Dec. 2017) [hereinafter Vaccination Policies]. 
308. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53G-9-303(2), 304(iii)(b); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.001(c)(1)(B); 
IDAHO CODE § 39-4802(2); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-8.1(8); IND. CODE § 21-40-5-6(a); see also Vaccination 
Policies, supra note 307, at 2. 
309. See Vaccination Policies, supra note 307, at 2. 
 310. FLA. STAT. § 458.303(f) (g). 
 311. GA. CODE. ANN. § 43-34-22(b)(2). 
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allow for religious exemptions to medical licensure or treatment laws qualify the 
exemption by prohibiting the administration of controlled or prescribed substances. Under 
California law, an individual may practice healing arts or alternative medicine so long as 
the individual satisfies certain disclosure requirements and does not perform surgery or 




provided under the law in question is sufficient to show that a state has a less restrictive 
means of furthering its compelling interest rather than prosecuting a caregiver who assists 
with self-induced abortion. Similar to how Hobby Lobby broadened the religious 
exemption in the contraceptive mandate to include for-profit corporations, the existence 
of a religious exception under medical licensure laws shows that expanding the statutes to 
include additional groups is not an unworkable alternative. Further, broadening religious 
religious exercise. As a result, a state has less 
restrictive means to protect the health and safety of pregnant people aside from prosecuting 
and convicting caregivers who assist with self-induced abortion due to a religious or 
spiritual motivation.   
V. CONCLUSION
As described above, a caregiver who assists another with self-induced abortion may 
face criminal charges under unauthorized practice of medicine laws. However, if a 
caregiver assists in self-induced abortion due to a religious or spiritual motivation, she 
should assert as a defense a violation of her right to religious exercise under a state RFRA. 
A caregiver should raise her defense under a state RFRA because it affords broader 
protections than does the First Amendment. Unlike the First Amendment, state RFRAs 
protect religiously- or spiritually-motivated conduct even when the substantial burden on 
religious exercise arises from a neutral law of general applicability. In 
t
religious exercise constitute a 
substantial burden. 
Yet, some factors complicate how a state court will interpre
RFRA cases are infrequent, particularly in the criminal defense context. In addition, each 
RFRA is uniquely drafted. Consequently, state courts sometimes fail to apply strict 
scrutiny to RFRA defenses and claims, making a successful outcome for a caregiver 
unpredictable. Despite uncertainties, the paucity of state RFRA case law places an 
emphasis on federal interpretations of RFRA. Some state courts have already begun to rely 
on federal sources of authority when adjudicating state RFRA defenses and claims. 
Further, recent decisions indicate that, when adjudicating criminal or civil RFRA issues, 
                                                          
 312. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2053.5. 
 313. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-18(c)(1) to (5). 
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Hobby Lobby 
decision. Thus, a state court could Hobby Lobby to a 
RFRA defense. 
The RFRA analysis in Hobby Lobby is advantageous to a caregiver who is charged 
definition of religious exercise is far more expansive than that under the First Amendment. 
-induce abortion can easily 
be placed within the context of religion religious and spiritual leaders have assisted 
women in obtaining abortions for decades. In addition, some individuals provide abortion 
services specifically because they have been spiritually called to do so. Accordingly, the 
assertion that providing abortion care may fit within the definition of free exercise is 
sound. 
Next, Hobby Lobby’s definition of what constitutes a substantial burden is broad; it 
includes indirect burdens on free exercise such as economic penalties. A state places a 
s her with a statute such as 
the unauthorized practice of medicine. If incarcerated, a caregiver is completely prohibited 
from assisting with self-induced abortion. In addition to limitations on her physical liberty, 
a caregiver also faces heavy fines related to the violation of the statute.   
Finally, the Hobby Lobby decision details what is required of a state to demonstrate 
that its actions are the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest. Similar 
Hobby Lobby, a state court would likely determine that a state 
-
induced abortion. However, a state would likely fail to satisfy a court that prosecuting and 
convicting a caregiver was the least restrictive means of furthering its interest. Under 
Hobby Lobby, a state is required to prove that it lacked an alternative means to further its 
 and 
describing why those alternatives are inviable. Specifically, if a state already provides a 
religious exemption under an unauthorized practice of medicine statute, it must show why 
expanding the statute to include caregivers is unworkable. Thus, when a state fails to prove 
will have successfully asserted the RFRA as a criminal defense. 
—Violet S. Rush*
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